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Abstract: Political interest in territorial integrity and state sovereignty has always been to the 
fore in decisions made by governments faced with those who rebel. Thus, rebellion has been 
situated as an integral part of internal armed conflict rather than expanding it as part of external 
or international armed conflict. In this way, public international law has not only limited its 
scope of application but also failed to provide an effective legal framework for rebels who are 
not categorised as a party to international armed conflict. The enormous political support for 
“state sovereignty” and lack of necessary political will to recognise the right of rebellion at 
international level has played a vital role in this failure. 
Attempts to overcome the failure have never been effectively successful due to the fear 
of ruling authorities that recognition of the right of rebellion might provide legitimacy to 
opponents and put their authority at risk. The political power has always triumphed over the 
necessity to recognise the right of rebellion and this has resulted in the under-development of 
this area of law. Furthermore, the rebels have denied their accountability for asymmetrical use 
of force against state authorities based on their disadvantageous position under public 
international law. This unequal position between rebels and state authorities has created a “gap” 
in the current international legal framework.  
Keywords: Use of force; rebellion; persecution; self-determination; Islamic law; public 
international law; international humanitarian law 
I. Introduction 
This paper conducts a comparative analysis of Islamic law of rebellion and public 
international law on the use of force. It begins with a discussion of the law of rebellion in 
Islam followed by a detailed account of its potential to complement public international law 
in relation to use of force. The detailed account includes a historical overview of Islamic law 
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of rebellion and a systemic exposition of its relationship with international humanitarian law. 
It also includes an evaluation of the status and treatment of rebels during the post-charter 
legal framework that is adopted by the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols. 
This paper evaluates the overall effect that arbitrary categorisation of rebels into combatants, 
non-combatants and unlawful combatants has on the justification to use excessive and 
asymmetrical force. It will argue that Islamic law of rebellion has a crucial role to play in the 
evolution of public international law on the use of force.   
Islamic law prohibits terrorism1 but permits rebellion against internal authority i.e., 
government, in order to “enjoin good and forbid evil”.2 Some jurists used this notion to argue 
that a ruler must enjoin the good and forbid the evil by suppressing any rebellion, thus 
protecting the nation from the disorder and instability introduced by rebels.3 Whereas some 
scholars have used this Qur’anic source to argue the right of the ruler to suppress rebellion,4 
other scholars have used a hadith source to argue rebellion as legitimate against unjust 
rulers.5 For instance, there is a hadith from the Prophet Muhammad that “if people see an 
oppressor and they do not oppose him then God will punish all of them”.6 However, these 
arguments of Islamic scholars  neither prohibit rebellion nor its suppression. As a result, 
currently scholarly position on rebellion provides a platform for critical analysis of this 
branch of law. This platform, which has been set up by the classical Muslim jurists, has 
progressed further and developed a special branch of Islamic law of rebellion.  
                                                          
1 For “terrorism” see below.  
2 Al-Qur’an 3:104, 9:71, 9:112, 22:41, 3:114, 7:157, 9:67, 31:17. Abu Yusuf Translation. The principle 
of ‘enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong’ (al-amr bi’l-ma‘ruf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar) 
as reiterated in verse 3:110 is considered as ‘a cardinal Qur’anic principle which lies at the root of many 
Islamic laws and institutions’, see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam 
(Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 2010), 28. See also Michael Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003). In a recent case before the International Criminal 
Court the accused relied on the principle of al-amr bi’l-ma‘ruf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar as a 
justification for the destruction of cultural property in Mali, see Mohmed Elewa Badar and Noelle 
Higgins, ‘Discussion Interrupted: The Destruction and Protection of Cultural Property under 
International Law and Islamic Law – The Case of Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi’  (2017) 17 International 
Criminal Law Review 486-516. 
3 al-Buhuti, Kashaf al-Qina an Matn al-Ina, vol 6 (Riyad: Maktabat al-Nasr al-hadithah, n.d.) 158. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Zahiri Ibn Hazm, al-Muhala, vol 11 (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Tujari, n.d.) 98. The classification between 
“just and unjust” rulers lies on their recourse to force. For instance, a ruler is unjust if he commands 
persecution (fitna) to oppress his subjects who are weak and helpless (al-mustadafin).  
6 Abi Zakariya al-Nawawi, Riyadd al-Salihin (Beirut: Dar al-hadith, n.d.) 109.  
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Rebellion is classified exclusively as an internal matter of a state as opposed to an 
external matter in public international law.7 This position has hindered the development of an 
effective legal framework in the corpus of public international law in relation to rebellion. 
However, the implementation of Islamic international law and its scholarship on the matter in 
Muslim majority states could have a positive impact on international law in this regard, since 
it would create a legal framework that would not only apply  at domestic level but would also 
create a uniform state practice of these states when it comes to rebellion. Such state practice 
could eventually lead to the recognition of certain concepts as customary international law. 
This does not of course preclude the option of signing an international treaty incorporating 
some basic principles on the status of rebels before the law, not only between Muslim 
majority states but on a broader level.  
However, strong political support for “state sovereignty” and lack of political will to 
recognise the right of rebellion at international level has so far played a vital role in 
preventing this from materialising. The attempts to overcome the hindrance have never been 
successful due to the fear of the ruling authorities that recognition of the right of rebellion 
might provide legitimacy to their opponents and put their authority at risk.  
In these circumstances, public international law and Islamic law have developed 
separate legal principles to deal with rebellion. Whereas international law has failed to 
develop a body of effective legal principles, Islamic law has failed to continue the 
enforcement of the legal principles that emerged in its early development period. Thus, these 
two legal systems have created a ‘gap’ in terms of the legal principles that apply to rebels. 
The existence of this gap is significant due to the fact that all the subjects of these two legal 
systems are not regulated by the same legal framework and this difference has resulted in a 
legitimacy-deficit because they are incapable of operating as a single legal framework by 
complementing each other. Furthermore, this gap has created a way for terrorists to claim 
legitimacy of their violent use of force based on their own-invented ideologies. Therefore, it 
is of vital importance to fill this gap so that these two legal frameworks can complement each 
other and operate as a single body of laws.  
                                                          
7 Antonio Cassese, International Law, (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 2005) 429; Prosecutor v 
Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 
October 1995, para. 127; See also Mark Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great 
Power Diplomacy after Napoleon, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013), pp 353, xiv, 187. 
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In the task of filling this gap, Islamic law has a vital role to play and this is because it 
has developed a far-reaching body of laws to regulate rebellion. However, the most important 
task is to examine the nature and extent of this gap followed by the identification of any 
barrier that could potentially hinder the complementarity of these two systems and finally 
finding a way to overcome any such potential hindrance.  
This article is structured in the following manner:   Section II conducts a historical 
examination of the Islamic law of rebellion; Section III  provides a historical overview of 
rebellion in public international law; Section IV provides an overview of the modern legal 
framework of rebellion in international law; Section V focuses on differences between 
Islamic law and public international law in relation to the status and treatment of rebels; 
Section VI considers how Islamic law of rebellion may complement international 
humanitarian law.  
 
II. What is the Islamic Law of Rebellion? 
Rebellion, in Islamic Law, is defined by the noun baghy (pl. bughāh) which literally means 
injustice or transgression.8 Unlike the common belief among the vast majority of Muslim 
scholars at present, surprisingly the term here does not carry any derogatory or negative 
connotations, as maintained by the Shaf‘i jurists,9 nor does the act of rebellion constitute a 
sin, as believed by Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328).10 The jurists used the term bughāh for rebels 
because it referred to one of the conflicting parties in the Qur’anic text addressing the law of 
rebellion. The jurists of the four schools of Islamic law define rebels as: “a group of Muslims 
that possesses some power and organisation (shawkah, manʻah, fay‘ah) and that gathers, 
under the command of a leader, to fight against a ruler claiming, whether rightly or wrongly, 
that they have a ta’wīl (just cause, plausible interpretation) for their rebellion, secession or 
non-compliance with an obligation”.11 
                                                          
8 Abu al-Fadl Muhammad Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab (Cairo: Dar al-Maʻarif n.d.) 11: 816; Ahmed Al-
Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 150. 
9 Muḥammad al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muḥtāj ilā Ma‛rifah Ma‛ānī Alfāẓ al-Minhāj, vol 4, 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.) 124; see also Muḥammad ibn Abī al-‛Abbās Aḥmad ibn Ḥamzah al-Ramlī, 
Nihāyah al-Muḥtāj ilā Sharḥ al-Minhāj, vol 7 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984) 402.  
10 Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Khilāfah wa al-Mulk (Jordan: Makhtab al-Manar, 1994) 89. 
11 For classification between “just and unjust” rulers see (n.6). See also Ahmed Al-Dawoody (n.9) 150; 
‛Abd al-Qādir ‛Awdah, Criminal Law of Islam, vol I (Zakir Aijaz tr, New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, reprint 
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Despite the fact that the justification for rebellion is invalid from the perspective of 
the majority of Muslims, classical Muslim jurists explain that the bughāh are excused 
because, from the perspective of the bughāh, they think that their actions are justified.12 
Whereas Ibn Taymiyyah has claimed that the term bughāh does not mean that rebels have 
committed a sin but fighting against them is permitted in order to prevent their harm to 
security and stability.13 The Hanafi (a school of thought within the Sunni sect which majority 
of the Muslims adhere to) position maintained that the rebels were sinners.14 There are also 
disagreements among Muslim jurists about whether anyone would qualify for their status as 
bughāh for rebellion  not only against an unjust ruler but also against a just ruler.15 This 
uncertainty has also worked well for rulers in refusing to recognise the status of rebels in 
Islamic law.16 However, this uncertainty does not have any significant role to play in 
identifying the rebels because both rebels and rulers are keen to justify themselves as just and 
legitimate. Hence, as long as their cause is just and legitimate people may rebel against their 
ruler and similarly a ruler may supress rebellion only if it is not just and legitimate.   
In this situation, the dilemma between the proponents and opponents of rebellion in 
Islamic law has been a contentious issue. If a right of rebellion is permissible in Islamic law 
then people cannot legitimately use the right to rebel if the ruler has a legitimate right to use 
force to end rebellion. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a theoretical analysis of the right 
of rebellion and the authority of the ruler to use force to supress any rebellion. A 
reconciliation of this dilemma is a necessary precondition for understanding the potential of 
Islamic law of rebellion to complement public international law.   
There are two ways to reconcile the issue raised in the dilemma, namely (a) by 
analysing every incident of rebellion as an individual case; or (b) by analysing the law of 
rebellion in Islam. The issue with the first option lies in the fact that individual analysis of 
incidents of rebellion would not effectively address the issue raised in the dilemma. This is 
                                                          
2005) 113 f.; F.A. Klein, The Religion of Islam, 1st paperback ed. (London: Curzon Press, 1985), p. 
182. 
12 Ahmed Al-Dawoody (n.9) 150. 
13 Ibn Taymiyyah (n.11) 89. This position has also been supported by Hanbal’i jurists.  
14 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
238. 
15 Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, al-Hawi al-Kabir Sharh Mukhtasar al-Muzani (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-
Ilmiyya, 1994) XIII: 97; see also Ahmed Al-Dawoody (n.9) 151.  
16 Jeffrey T. Kennedy, Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 52. 
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because the piecemeal fashion of analysis of a rebellion would only respond to a particular 
incident, and hence be likely to create many categories of rebellion and their legitimacy. On 
the other hand, the second option would not only generalise the law of rebellion in Islam but 
would also be conclusive on the legitimate position of the right to rebel and its corresponding 
resistance by the rulers. The following section discusses the law of rebellion in Islam and 
addresses the question ‘where does legitimacy of rebellion lie?’ In this discussion, the authors 
have adopted a comparative approach in the analysis of sources of Islamic law, history of 
rebellion in Islam, and state practice adopted by the Caliphs, rulers, and rebellions in early 
Islamic history.  
A. Islamic law of rebellion 
Rebellion (bughāh) in Islamic law regulates the circumstances in which use of force is 
allowed against the rulers of an Islamic state and the treatment of rebels by the rulers. In 
addition to the Qur’anic resource referred above, Islamic scholars have argued legitimacy of 
rebellion against unjust rulers on the basis of their own exegesis.17 They have come to this 
conclusion on the basis that whereas it is obligatory for every Muslim to obey their rulers18 as 
the latter have the duty to maintain stability19 and order in the state, if they give sinful 
commands to their people, such obligation ceases and Muslims have the right to disregard the 
rulers and fight them.20 These scholars also emphasise that the right to rebel emanates from 
                                                          
17 Ibn Taymiyyah (n.11) 12; Mohammad Rashid Rida, Tafsir al-Manar, vol 6 (Cairo: Matbaʽah al-
Manar, 1923) 367; Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Al-Jarimah wa al-Qqubah fi al-Fiqh al-Islami (Cairo: Dar 
al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1998) 130; Zahiri Ibn Hazm (n.5) 98; see also James Turner Johnson and John Kelsey 
(eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic 
Tradition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) 151.  
18 Al-Qur’an 4:59, Abu Yusuf translation; See also Ahmed Al-Dawoody (n.9) 148; Muhammad 
Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State (5th edn, Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1968) 184; Majid Khadduri, War 
and Pace in Islam (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1990) 78; Abdulrahman Alsumaih, “The Sunni 
Concept of Jihad in Classical Fiqh and Modern Islamic Thought”, PhD thesis, University of Newcastle 
Upon Tyne (1998) 91. 
19 Al-Qur’an 49:9-10. Abu Yusuf translation; see also James Turner Johnson and John Kelsey (eds) 
(n.18) 152. 
20 Ibn Taymiyyah (n. 11) 12; Mohammad Rashid Rida (n.18) 367; Muhammad Abu Zahrah (n.18) 130; 
Zahiri Ibn Hazm (n.6) 98; See also Muhammad Hamidullah (n.19) 184; Bernard Lewis, Islam in 
History: Ideas, Men and Events in the Middle East (London: Alcove Press, 1973) 256; Ann Lambton, 
State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The 
Jurists, vol 36 (Oxford University Press, 1981) 313; Khaled Abou El-Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic 
Jurisprudence and Western Legal History” (1998) 4 U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 
11, 14.  
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the Qur’anic command to “enjoin good and forbid evil”21 and this right has also been 
established in a Prophet’s Sunna where he is reported to have said that: 
To hear and obey the ruler is obligatory, so long as one is not commanded to disobey 
God for if one is commanded to disobey God, he shall not hear or obey.22 
On the contrary, with regards to the right of rebellion against rulers, while the Qur’an does 
not explicitly command rebellion against unjust rulers, the following Qur’anic verse creates a 
powerful symbolic construct to justify rebellion:  
Would not you fight in the way of Allah for al-mustadafin (the oppressed socially 
weak Muslims) from men, women and children who pray: Our Lord! Take us from 
this city of the oppressive people and appoint for us from Your side a guardian and 
appoint us from Your side a protector.23 
In addition to the Qur’anic support for rebellion stated above, there is the practice and 
conduct of many of the Prophet’s companions and several of the early jurists who took part 
in, supported or sympathised with, a variety of rebellions. These counter-traditions represent 
tendencies or trends in early legal opinions but did not develop as systematic positions.24 For 
example, some versions of these traditions stated that a ruler should be obeyed as long as he 
implements the book of God, or in some versions, as long as he leads Muslims in accordance 
with the book of God.25 Other reports make the duty of blind obedience applicable only in the 
time of the Prophet.26 A set of widely cited traditions explicitly states that a ruler should not 
be obeyed if he commands a sin, or that he should be obeyed only to the extent that he 
commands what is good and just.27 These traditions promote or encourage resistance to rulers 
                                                          
21 Al-Qur’an 3:104, 9:71, 9:112, 22:41, 3:114, 7:157, 9:67, 31:17. Abu Yusuf Translation.  
22 Ahmad Ibn Hajar al-ʻAsqalani, Fath al-Bari bi Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1993) 
XIV: 121. 
23 Al-Qur’an 4:75, Abu Yusuf translation.  
24 Khaled Abou El Fadl (n.15) 120. 
25 Abu Bakr al Shaybani, Kitab al-Sunnah (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1993) 492; Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, 
Musnad (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1993) VI:451; Abu al-Husayn Muslim b. al-Hajjaj, Al-Famiʻ al-
Sahih (Beirut: Dar al-Maʽrifa, n.d.) VI: 15; ‘Abu Abd Muhammad Ibn Maja, Sunan (Beirut: Dar Ihya’ 
al-Kutub al-‘Arabiyya, n.d.) II:955; Abu al-‘Abbas al-Qastalani, Irshad al-Sari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 
(Cairo: Dar al-Fikr 1304 AH) X:170; see also Aksi Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi, Al-Majmuʻ Sharh al-
Muhadhdhab (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr n.d.) XII: 468.  
26 Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Musnad (n.26) II:279.  
27 Sulayman Abu Dawud, Sunan (Cairo: Dar al-Hadith 1988) IV: 94; Abu Bakr Ahmad al-Bazzar, Al-
Bahr al-Zakhkhar (Medina: Maktabat al-‘Ulum wa al-Hikam, 1988) II:204; Abu al-Husayn Muslim b. 
al-Hajjaj (n.26) VI:15; ‘Abu Abd Muhammad Ibn Maja (n.26) II:956.  
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in one form or another. A common form of this genre states that the best form of jihad is a 
word of truth spoken before an unjust ruler.28 Moreover, Caliph Ali reportedly said that if the 
Kharijites29 rebel against an unjust ruler then Muslims should not fight them because in this 
situation they may have a legitimate cause for their rebellion.30  
From the exegetical point of view, the Islamic law of rebellion is founded and 
developed on the Qur’anic text as well as the Sunna of the Prophet. However, the history of 
rebellion in Islam suggests that it began following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 
632CE.31 Therefore, the law of rebellion in Islam has been developed in precedents of the 
Caliphs, rulers and rebellions that took place during the early Islamic history.32 During this 
time, rebellion in Islam took place in response to the alleged oppression and persecution of 
                                                          
28 Abu Isa Muhammad al-Tirmidhi, al-Famiʽ al-Sahih (Cairo: Dar al-Hadith, 1987) IV: 409.  
29 ‘The Kharijites [or Khawarij] were the first identifiable sect of Islam. Their identity emerged as 
followers of [Prophet] Muhammad attempted to determine the extent to which one could deviate from 
ideal norms of behaviour and still be called Muslim. The extreme Kharijite position was that Muslims 
who commit grave sins effectively reject their religion, entering the ranks of apostates, and therefore 
deserve capital punishment. This position was considered excessively restrictive by the majority of 
Muslims, as well as by moderate Kharijites, who held that a professed Muslim could not be declared an 
unbeliever (kafir). The Kharijites believed it was forbidden to live among those who did not share their 
views, thus acquiring the name by which they are known in mainstream Islamic historiography—
khawarij means “seceders” or “those who exit the community.” Radical Kharijites, on the other hand, 
declared those who disagreed with their position to be apostates, and they launched periodic military 
attacks against mainstream Muslim centres until they ceased to be a military threat in the late 8th century 
CE.’ See Tamra Sonn and Adam Farrar, ‘Kharijites’ in Oxford Bibliographies available at < 
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0047.xml>  
(accessed 26 July 2019). 
30 ‘Abd Allah Muhammad Ibn Abi-Shayba, Al-Musannaf fi al-Ahadith wa al-Athar (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 
1989) VIII: 737. It is to be noted that ‘during the fourth Caliph ‘Ali’s reign (656-661 CE), the Khawarij 
and Shi‘a movements split from the Sunni majority. The Battle of Siffin (657 CE) had pit- ted 
Mu‘awiya, the then governor of Syria, against ‘Ali, with the former charging ‘Ali with not bringing the 
third Caliph Uthman’s killers to justice. However, ‘Ali refused to fight his Muslim brothers, and so they 
agreed to settle their dispute through arbitration.41 A civil war nevertheless ensued, as 12,000 of ‘Ali’s 
sup- porters (who subsequently became the Khawarij) disagreed with settling the matter by means of 
human arbitration. They contended that ‘Ali should have turned to divine judgement and applied the 
law of retaliation, as prescribed by the Qur’an.42 Citing their slogan la hukma illa lillah (‘Authority 
belongs to God alone’), the Khawarij called upon all Muslims to follow the Qur’an to the letter. This 
was the first occurrence in Islamic history of a sect appropriating the right to declare takfir against 
fellow Muslims, and the rise of the Khawarij.’ See Mohamed Elewa Badar et al., ‘The Radical 
Application of the Islamic Concept of Takfir’ (2017) 31 Arab Law Quarterly 134, at 142  
31 Ahmed Al-Dawoody (n.9) 147. 
32 Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛: Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab, ed. Maḥmūd Maṭrajī 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2000), Vol. 20, p. 337; ‛Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb al-Māwardī, Al-Ḥāwī al-
Kabīr: Fī Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‛ī Raḍī Allah ‛anh wa huwa Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Muznī, (ed.) 
‛Alī Muḥammad Mu‛awwaḍ and ‛Ādil Aḥmad ‛Abd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 
1999), Vol. 13, p. 104; see also Ahmed Al-Dawoody (n.9) 149. 
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the ruling authorities.33 As a result, oppression or persecution (fitna) has been one of the 
fundamental principles of use of force in Islamic law.34 Thus, it is incumbent on Muslims to 
fight any oppression or persecution.  
As spreading fitna is prohibited in Islam,35 any rebellion which has the potential to 
cause fitna within the community is prohibited and this is consistent with the prohibition of 
rebellion against the rulers. This prohibition against fitna suggests that, it is not limited to 
particular conflicts that took place in Islamic history, but extends to prohibit any situation that 
might result in a fitna.36 Likewise, it is not the Kharijites, as a specific historical entity, that 
are reprehensible, but any other group that follows in its footsteps.37 In other words, fitna is 
not limited to the use of force by or on behalf of the Kharijites who were responsible for 
spreading this within Islamic community but also included other groups which had recourse 
to force for the same purpose. This principle justifies the use of force to end oppression or 
persecution caused by rebellion.38 However, if the ruler spreads fitna then it is incumbent on 
Muslims to end that fitna, if necessary, by rebellion. Furthermore, from the Qur’anic 
exegetical viewpoint use of force is allowed to end persecution and the persecution can come 
from the ruler as well as the rebels.39 Therefore, in Islam both the rebels and rulers have the 
reciprocal right to use force to end oppression or persecution.  
The above discussion suggests that reconciliation between the right to use force by 
rebels and rulers to supress rebellion is irreconcilable. While Muslim jurists were not willing 
to endorse or legitimate all rebellions without limits, they also were not willing to give rulers 
unfettered discretion in dealing with rebels.40 As a result, legitimacy of use of force by and 
against rebels in Islamic international law moved from “jus ad bellum” to “jus in bello”. 
Whereas, “jus ad bellum” denotes the legitimate right to use force by and against rebellion, 
“jus in bello” denotes legitimate methods of use of such force.41 In other words, on the one 
                                                          
33 ‘Abd Allah Muhammad Ibn Abi-Shayba (n.31) VIII: 622; see also Abu Bakr al Shaybani (n.26) 507. 
34 ‘Fitna’ has been adopted in this article to mean ‘persecution’.  
35 ‘Abd Allah Muhammad Ibn Abi-Shayba (n.31) VIII: 622; see also Abu Bakr al Shaybani (n.26) 507. 
36 Khaled Abou El Fadl (n.15) 118. 
37 Jeffrey T. Kennedy (n.17) 31; see also Khaled Abou El Fadl (n.15) 118. 
38 Hasan Ismaʻil al-Hudaybi, Duʽah..la qudah (Cairo: Dar al-Tibaʻa wa’l-Nashr al-Islamiyya, 1977) 58.  
39 Syed Imadoud-Din Asad, ‘Islamic Humanitarian Law’ cited in M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sharia and 
Islamic Criminal Justice in Time of War and Peace (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 166. 
40 Ahmed Al-Dawoody (n.9) 157.  
41 Hilmi M. Zawati, “Jus in Bello: Civilians’ Fundamental Rights under Islamic and Public International 
Law” in M. Cherif Bassiouni and A. Guellali (eds), Jihad and Its Challenges to International and 
Domestic Law (The Hague: Hague Academic Press, 2010) 167; see also Mohamed Badar, “Ius in Bello 
under Islamic International Law” (2013) 13(3) International Criminal Law Review 593. 
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hand “jus ad bellum” determines the right of rebels to recourse to force, on the other hand 
“jus in bello” determines the extent of the right. For example, “jus ad bellum” decides if the 
rebels have a legal right to use force in the course of their rebellion, and “jus in bello” 
determines the nature and extent of the use of force by rebels in the course of their rebellion 
and by the rulers in the course of preventing the same.   
The following section undertakes a comparative analysis of the use of force (jus in 
bello) between public international law and Islamic international law in relation to rebellion. 
The section begins with an overview of use of force by and against rebels in public 
international law followed by a critical analysis of this use of force in comparison to Islamic 
international law.  
B. The potential of Islamic law of rebellion to complement Public international law on the 
Use of Force 
Despite several attempts to regulate the use of force by and against rebels by bringing it 
within the international legal framework,42 it has not been possible to provide an effective 
legal framework for rebels to exercise their right, within the bounds of their legal 
responsibilities. The political interests based on “state sovereignty” have been unable to take 
a course towards providing an effective solution to the use of force issues in rebellion. The 
political power has always triumphed over the necessity to recognise the right of rebellion 
and this has resulted in the under-development of this area of law. Furthermore, the rebels 
have denied their own accountability for asymmetrical use of force against state authorities 
on the basis of their disadvantageous position under international law on the use of force.  
Their disadvantageous position lies in the fact that rulers are not accountable for their 
use of force against rebels. As the rulers are not accountable to any international legal 
framework for their use of force against rebels under the political umbrella known as 
“sovereignty”, the rebels’ denial of accountability for their use of force against the ruling 
authorities makes the latter’s claim a very strong one. This claim becomes even stronger 
when the rebels are categorised or labelled as terrorists by the rulers, without offering any 
justification, legal or factual. In these circumstances, the asymmetric use of force by rebels 
against the rulers, such as kidnapping government officials in retaliation against extra judicial 
killing of rebels by the state, often win sympathy and support of the civilian population.  
                                                          
42 See Section under the title “The status of rebels in Public International Law” below.  
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III. Historical overview of Rebellion in Public international law 
The right of revolution was accepted by several societies from ancient Greece and Rome and 
was also accepted by early international law scholars such as Grotius and Vattel.43 The issue 
of rebellion gained further attention from the Second Scholastica.44 One of the strongest 
proponents of the right of rebellion was the Spanish theologian Fr Jean de Mariana. Indeed, 
as is seen in his work De Rege et Regis Institutione,45 Mariana was in favour of tyrannicide in 
situations of political repression.46  The use of force to overthrow tyranny could be 
considered a type of “Just War”, or justifiable war.47 Thomas Aquinas was of the view that a 
public rising against the government for the common good was not sedition.48 While 
multifarious examples of what constituted a Just War have been suggested  from the Early 
Christian period onwards, 49 Aquinas, in the 13th century in his work Summa Theologiaie, 
proposed a number of just war criteria. A war was just if (1) it was waged under a proper 
authority, (2) it had a just cause and (3) the belligerents had the right intention, i.e. they must 
intend to promote good and subdue evil.50  Historically, however, international law was slow 
and hesitant to engage with the issue of rebellion.51  
This positive view of rebellion gained more support with the rise of the sovereign state 
system, in tandem with the emergence of the theories of the social contract and natural law.52 
                                                          
43 Jordan J. Paust, “The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Norms of Social 
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44 R. Ariew and D. Gabbay, “The scholastic background” in D. Garber and M. Ayers (eds), Cambridge 
History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1998) 15. 
45 This text is available at: 
<https://books.google.ie/books?id=Whk8AAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=
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46 Harald E. Braun, Juan de Mariana and Early Spanish Political Thought, (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: 
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Alex J. Bellamy (ed), War: Critical Concepts in Political Science, vol IV (Routledge, 2009) 23.  
49 Inis L. Claude Jr, “Just Wars: Doctrine and Institutions” (1980) 95 Political Science Quarterly 83, 87.  
50 St Thomas Aquinas (n.47) Quest 42, Art 2; Just War Theory, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
<http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/> (visited 14 March 2017); see also Ahmed Al-Dawoody (n.9) 158. 
51 Ignacio De La Rasilla Del Moral, “Medieval International Law” in Oxford Bibliographies in 
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52 Hall Gardner and Oleg Kobtzeff, “General Introduction: Polemology” in Hall Gardner and Oleg 
Kobtzeff (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins and Prevention (Ashgate, 2012) 7; 
see also Laura Perna, The Formation of the Treaty Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Leiden; 
Boston: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) 9.  
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For example, Locke, proposes an argument for legitimate rebellion in his work Second 
Treatise of Government.53 Locke drew a distinction between legitimate governments, which 
seek to promote and preserve the rights of their citizens, and illegitimate governments which 
do not.54 Legitimate governments  deserve that their citizens behave well and remain 
peaceful.55 Because illegitimate governments violate the rights of their citizens they put 
themselves in a state of war with their citizens, hence rebellion is legitimate.56 Concerning this 
right of revolution,  President Abraham Lincoln said: 
This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it.  Whenever they 
shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional 
right of amending, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it.57 
The principle ignited by the American Revolution spread throughout Europe during the late 
18th and 19th centuries58 as a revamped version of the Just War theory,59 whereby it was 
claimed that a state that denied the rights of the peoples it purported to rule was not fit to rule, 
and that certain actions of the state could give its citizens a just cause to revolt.60 States 
continued, in the 19th and 20th centuries , to use the rhetoric of justice and justness when they 
used force against rebels but the justification produced no legal reverberations.61 The newly 
created states following imperialism and colonialism were confronted with the challenge of 
legitimate government that governed the people for the common good. The people were often 
subject to tyranny and denial of their rights by the government. In these circumstances, the 
                                                          
53 This text is available at: <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm.> (visited 14 March 
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309. 
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58 Theodore S. Woolsey, “Self-Determination” (1919) 13 AJIL 13 302. 
59 Joachim von Elbe, “The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law” (1939) 33 
AJIL 665; see also Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War (New York: Basic Books, 2000) 5. 
60 Jordan J. Paust (n.44) 547. 
61 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th edn, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 69. 
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right to rebellion was at its highest peak. On the other hand, governments were also claiming 
their right to suppress rebellion on the basis of their sovereign power and legitimate 
authority.62  
IV. The Modern Legal Framework of Rebellion: The Post-Charter 
Arrangements of Public International Law 
Following the collapse of the League of Nations and the end of the Second World War, the 
UN Charter took the lead in promoting  international peace and security.63 The first post-
Charter provision which officially recognised the right of rebellion was the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  It states that “it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to 
have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights 
should be protected by the rule of law”. 64 This position of the right of rebellion on the basis 
of human rights was further developed during the 1960s and 1970s.65 The issues of 
colonialism and self-determination were linked together at the fore of the UN's agenda, with 
both the General Assembly and the Security Council adopting various resolutions on the 
topic, both general and country-specific. 66  However, these types of resolutions were too 
ambiguous to gain consensus.67 For example, early General Assembly resolutions on 
Portuguese colonies and on the situation in Namibia affirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of 
the people in these territories but did not spell out the nature and extent of their right to use 
armed force.68 This type of constructive ambiguity in resolutions is also evident in other UN 
resolutions on the issue of self-determination.69 The ambiguity of the resolutions reemphasis 
                                                          
62 Mark Jarrett  (n.8) 187. 
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67 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2004) 
53. 
68 GA Res 2707 (1970); 2652 (1970); and 3295 (1974) cited in Christine Gray (n.68) 62.  
69 See Resolutions reaffirming Resolution 2105: Resolution 2189 (XXI), 1966, 76:7:20; Resolution 
2326 (XXII), 1967, 86:6:17; Resolution 2446 (XXIII), 1968, 83:5:28; Resolution 2465 (XXIII), 1968, 
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the reluctance of the state parties to the UN to recognise the right of rebellion against their 
government or ruler.  
While, General Assembly instruments do not go so far as to legalise the use of force by 
rebels, Western powers always vote against such resolutions70 and so their value as a valid 
interpretation of international law is doubtful:   a lack of support for the resolutions hinder the 
creation of customary international law.71 It should be emphasised that while the right of a 
tyrant was denied in the international legal framework, the right to use force against such 
tyrant, in the form of a right of rebellion, has not been universally accepted. While the use of 
force to overthrow tyranny has utilised a “Just War” argument, such use of violence has 
regularly been condemned by Western states.72 Therefore, in international law there is no 
unqualified right of rebels to use force to overthrow a tyrannical or despotic government.73   
While support for the right of revolution under international law has waxed and waned 
over the years, it has never been fully and definitively codified as a legal principle.74 In some 
contexts there is support for the legitimate use of force in rebellion in the context of fighting 
tyranny or serious human rights abuses and in furtherance of the right to self-determination.75 
However, these examples have never been fully endorsed by the international community by 
means of a legal instrument, although there is, as evidenced above, some scholarship and state 
practice to support this view. Therefore, the issue of jus ad bellum with regard to rebellion is 
filled with uncertainty,76 and indeed, the rights and protections which attach to those who seek 
to rebel against the government were and still are, as we shall see below, vague and 
amorphous.  
A. The status of rebels in Public International Law 
                                                          
70 Voting records can be accessed at: 
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73 Antonio Cassese (n.8) 433. 
74 Heather Wilson (n.73) 22. 
75 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 377. 
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Rebellion involves sporadic and isolated challenges to the government.  The criteria of 
rebellion are vague and uncertain, and the term can cover many instances of minor violence 
within the borders of a state, ranging from violent protests to an easily quelled uprising. 77 
Assistance from a third state is regarded as unlawful intervention and a third state is bound to 
respect the measures taken by the parent state for the suppression of the seditious party – for 
example a prohibition on the importation of war material bound for the rebels.78 Rebellions 
fall within the exclusive remit of the sovereign state and no rights or duties accrue to the 
rebels, who can legally be treated as criminals under domestic law and do not enjoy prisoner 
of war status if captured.79 
International humanitarian law, which is a special branch of public international law, 
also deals with rebellion. This branch of law regulates the treatment of rebels from an 
international perspective and determines the extent of the right of the ruling authorities to use 
force to suppress rebellion. What follows is an examination of the efficiency of this special 
branch of law in regulating rebellion.  
B. The status of rebels under the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols 
International humanitarian law distinguishes between international and non-international 
armed conflicts, which are governed by different protective regimes.80 Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is the only provision of the Conventions which deals with 
non-international armed conflicts. 81 This provision “marked a fundamental change in that the 
automatic applicability of the legal protection for rebels has been recognised by the 
                                                          
77 Bert V.A. Röling, “The Legal Status of Rebels and Rebellion” (1976) 13 J. Peace Res 149; see also 
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78 Antonio Cassese (n.8) 127.  
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80 Rene Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 247; see also Emily Crawford, The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of 
Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2010) 2; Andrea Binachi and Yasmin Naqvi, International 
Humanitarian Law and Terrorism (Hart Publishing, 2011) 24; Dapo Akande, “Classification of Armed 
Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts” in Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed), International Law and the 
Classification of Conflicts (Oxford University Press, 2012) 32.  
81 D. Elder, “The Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949” 
(1979) 37 Case W Res J Int'l L 11; see also Emily Crawford (n.81) 2; Dapo Akande, “Classification of 
Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts” in Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed) (n.81) 50. 
16 
International legal framework.”82 This protective regime of International humanitarian law 
concerning non-international armed conflicts was extended in the form of Additional Protocol 
II.83 
However, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II do not adequately protect 
rebels. Moreover, these provisions have created a “gap” in the legal protection for rebels 
involved in any conflict which does not meet the requirement of an armed conflict.84 The 
“gap” that has been created by these legal provisions is outlined below. 
It is quite apparent that Common Article 3 has provided international bodies such as 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with the right to intervene in situations 
of non-international armed conflict, but the rights and obligations of the parties involved in 
the armed conflict i.e., the state authority and the rebels, are very limited.85 There has been no 
change in the rights and status of the rebels provided by Common Article 3 which is 
commonly regarded as the price demanded by delegates for the Article’s adoption, addressing 
the fear that a government’s capacity to suppress internal revolt would be interfered with.86  
Moreover, the application of the Article does not constitute any recognition by the 
government that the rebels have any authority; and rebellions may be suppressed and tried 
accordingly.87  
 
Another weak point of Common Article 3 is that neither the means and methods of 
war nor the conduct of hostilities are limited. 88  In the absence of such limitation it is difficult 
to ascertain what level of violence will trigger its application and the extent of such 
application.89 The ICRC’s Commentary states that Common Article 3 should be applied as 
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widely as possible,90 but the level of violence needed to trigger the application of the 
provision is still unsettled.91 In this situation, it is very unlikely that this Article will be 
triggered by violence which does not meet the requirement for “armed conflict”.92 For 
example, people caught up in incidents of violent and sustained riots may fall outside the 
protection remit of IHL. This issue was identified in Prosecutor v Tadić where the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia aptly emphasised: 
 
The low threshold of violence required to trigger Common Article 3 was underscored 
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the La Tablada case (Juan 
Carlos Abella v Argentina (Case 11.137, 18 November 1997), at paras 155-156), 
where the Commission affirmed the applicability of Common Article 3 in situations 
of attacks by an armed group on Argentine military personnel, despite the very brief 
duration of the attacks. Rather, the Commission focused on the extensive planning 
behind the attacks and the nature of the violence. In determining that the armed 
confrontation at the La Tablada base and its recapture by the Argentinian army 
constituted an internal armed conflict and not mere “internal disturbance or tensions” 
the Commission excluded the following situations from the definition of armed 
conflict as they fall below the threshold: riots, that is to say, all disturbances which 
from the start are not directed by a leader and have no concerted intent; isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence, as distinct from military operations carried out by armed 
forces or organized armed groups; other acts of a similar nature which incur, in 
particular, mass arrests of persons because of their behaviour or political opinion.93 
 
Since the adoption of Geneva Conventions in 1949, the face of conflict has changed over time 
and as non-international armed conflicts began to increase in number it was realised that the 
laws of war were in need of review and revitalisation.94  Negotiations on how to amend 
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international humanitarian law took place during the Diplomatic Conference for the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflict, which was convened between 1974 and 1977.95 During drafting negotiations of 
Additional Protocol II, it was clear that States did not want to grant status and rights to rebels 
who were threatening their authority. Indeed, Cassese comments that: 
To grant rebels international rights and duties means that the divide between insurgents 
and the legal government has reached such a point that the former has a standing, 
albeit limited, in the international community.96  
Cassese added: 
[T]o acknowledge that rebels are entitled to invoke international rules implies that they 
are outside both the physical and legal control of the national authorities. By contrast, 
to suggest that insurgents cannot rely on international law means that the only body of 
law applicable to them is domestic criminal law and consequently that the government 
in power is free from international constraint and can treat them as it thinks best.97  
Similarly, as correctly argued in the Commentary to the Additional Protocols, “governments 
are reluctant to assume treaty obligations which require them to extend a license to domestic 
enemies to commit acts of violence against their personnel and objects which could be 
described as military objectives.”98  
The above discussion makes it clear that despite having identified the “gap” the 
Additional Protocol II has failed to narrow it but has in fact made it wider. This is because the 
threshold to trigger Protocol II was further raised rather than lowered.  During the Geneva 
Conference, it was decided that the threshold of Protocol II should actually be raised from 
that of Common Article 3 because of a fear of an infringement of state sovereignty.99 The 
Protocol only applies if the dissidents control some territory and have the ability to 
implement the Protocol.  If, in the course of the conflict, the rebels lose this control or ability, 
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the Protocol is no longer applicable. In this way, Protocol II provides for the very 
unsatisfactory position that “the question of applicability of Protocol II might be answered 
varyingly, according to the prevailing circumstances.”100   
In addition, Protocol II does not clearly state how much territory must be under the 
control of the non-government party to the conflict or what constitutes “implementation” of 
the Protocol by the rebel forces. It is clear that “much is left up to the discretion of the State, 
which is not a very acceptable position as states will be reluctant to compromise their state 
sovereignty, even for serious humanitarian concerns.”101As observed by Leslie Green, 
Protocol II “has a threshold that is so high ... that it would exclude most revolutions and 
rebellions, and would probably not operate in a civil war until rebels were well established 
and had set up some form of de facto government”.102  In this respect, it must also be noted 
that Additional Protocol II does not apply to “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not 
being armed conflicts.”103 
Unlike Protocol I, Protocol II does not confer either combatant or prisoner of war 
status on rebels.  The Commentary to the Additional Protocols clarifies why this is the case: 
It seems unrealistic to establish combatant status for persons who have participated in 
hostilities and have been captured in non-international armed conflicts.  In fact, such 
status would be incompatible, first, with respect for the principles of sovereignty of 
States, and secondly, with national legislation which makes rebellion a crime.104 
Government authorities can still prosecute and sentence anyone who is found guilty of any 
offence which relates to the conflict, leading one scholar to comment: 
Protocol II has in effect restated the general rule of international law relating to the 
status of belligerency.  Before a situation assumes such a status, the conflict is to be 
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considered as a purely domestic affair. The fighters are not regarded as combatants and 
they are not entitled to the prisoner of wars status if they fall into the hands of the 
enemy.105 
From the above discussion it is apparent that there is arguably little in the nature of the 
protections accompanying combatants and POW status that can be applied to participants in 
non-international armed conflicts.106 There have been valiant efforts by International 
Tribunals to provide extended interpretation and application of the Article and Protocol II,107 
by National Governments granting amnesties to those involved in non-international armed 
conflicts and indeed in situations of violence which do not reach the threshold of armed 
conflict when the violence concerns issues of self-determination,108 and by the ICRC109 to 
extend the protective regime of international humanitarian law applicable to international 
armed conflicts to non-international armed conflicts. Despite these efforts, there have not been 
enough provisions and arrangements to form the basis of uniform combatant immunity for all 
persons who participate in non-international armed conflicts.110 
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In the modern world where rebellion is so frequent that it is likely to affect 
international peace and security, the post-Charter framework has failed to deal with it 
effectively. Moreover, the gap has allowed state authorities to use force and prosecute the 
rebels in the way they want without providing for any accountability. By locating rebellion 
within the sole authority of the state the rebels have been put in jeopardy in terms of their 
rights and treatment in the hands of their opponents without any measures for oversight or 
accountability by the latter. In addition to being subject to excessive force by the government, 
rebels are susceptible to prosecution for their use of force against the government, unlike the 
government.  This has put rebels in a disadvantageous position. In consequence, the current 
legal position favours the state authorities at the expense of the legitimate right of rebels to 
challenge tyrannical and despotic government.  
This gap has been identified subsequently in the Turku Declaration on Minimum 
Humanitarian Standards, adopted in 1990. The experts’ meeting recommended the adoption 
of another declaration of minimum humanitarian standards.111 However, this Declaration is 
not binding and has not had a significant impact on the treatment of individuals in situations 
of violence. Since its adoption, follow-up work has been undertaken in the United Nations on 
this issue but no binding instrument on the issue has been drafted as yet.112  
 
C.  The categorisation of rebels as combatants, non-combatants, and unlawful combatants 
A recent trend among state authorities is to identify a new category of the parties in hostilities 
i.e., unlawful combatant.113 In addition to the two categories of participants in warfare 
recognised by international humanitarian law, namely combatants and non-combatants. This 
invention of state authorities or governments has placed rebels in further jeopardy. The key 
point of determination between combatant and non-combatant has been the “direct 
participation in the hostilities” which denotes that any civilian who does not participate 
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directly in the hostilities must not be targeted.114 However, in recent non-international armed 
conflicts which are categorised as rebellions  many civilians have been killed by state 
authorities on the pretext that they had lost their civilian (non-combatant) status when they 
took arms in the disguise of civilians.115 That means, governments are treating such civilians 
not as  combatants or non-combatants but as “unlawful-combatants” in order to justify civilian 
deaths. The problem with this argument is that there is no evidence to support their claim that 
non-combatants lost their status for being involved in using counter force.116 Even if there is 
evidence in support, such claim is not legitimate as the government must not kill civilians who 
engage in violence, unless they are combatants.  
From the analysis and evidence of the nature and extent of use of force by 
governments against rebels it is suggested that the categorisation of “unlawful combatant” has 
been unilaterally benefiting governments.117 This is because it has been a difficult but not an 
impossible task for government forces to identify the rebels who carry out surprise attacks, 
disguised as civilians. In order to respond to this kind of threat from the rebels and to ease 
their task of identification of rebels, government forces have resorted to using indiscriminate 
force against civilians on the basis of their own assessment of such threat. For example, the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 in 1998 expressed grave concern at the 
excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army 
which had resulted in numerous civilian casualties and the displacement of over 230,000 
persons.118 Another example is the indiscriminate targeting of innocent civilians by United 
States and Afghan air forces resulting in increased  frequency and deaths.119 Figures given to 
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CNN by the Afghan Ministry of Defense show that more than 800 airstrikes since the end of 
June 2018 to October 2018 were carried out by the Afghan air forces.120 
 
V. The Status and Treatment of Rebels in Islamic Law in Contrast to Public 
International Law 
As indicated in the Qur’anic text regulating armed rebellion and the precedents set by the 
fourth caliph, a series of peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms must be followed before the 
state uses force against the rebels. The head of the Islamic state is required to send an envoy 
to the rebels to listen to their justifications for the use of force and if their justifications are 
found to be valid, then the state must fulfil their demands.121 If the envoy finds that their 
justifications are not valid, then he should explain to them the invalidity of their justifications 
and remove any misunderstanding that they have regarding the positions and/or decisions 
taken by the Islamic state.122 If these discussions fail, then the rebels should be called – 
according to some jurists – to a munāẓarah (public debate) between them and the state 
authorities so that the public can judge the justness of their cause.123  
If all these peaceful mechanisms fail, then the rebels should be advised/warned to 
renounce their plans for the use of force. If the rebels still insist and start using actual force 
against the state authorities, then specific rules of engagement apply in this category of 
internal armed conflict,124 as will be shown in the next paragraph. No such mechanism exists 
under customary international law, under which states are under no obligation to engage in 
any level of discussion with rebels, and can treat them as mere criminals, depending on the 
intensity of their challenge. This is an important aspect of Islamic law, a type of “preventative 
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diplomacy” which, if implemented generally, could help to avoid violent clashes between 
rebel groups and government forces. 
The Islamic law of rebellion guarantees a privileged status for the rebels during and, 
no less importantly, after the cessation of hostilities.125 At the outset, it is interesting to note 
that the rules of engagement put both the conflicting parties, the state army and the rebels, on 
an equal footing and thus the same rules apply to both of them.126 This means that both 
parties are to be held equally responsible for any violation of the rules of engagement of this 
specific category of internal armed conflict. As a rule, the jurists make it clear that on the part 
of the state forces, the aim of fighting is merely to force the rebels to stop their attack, 
radʻihim (to stop them) and not to kill them.127 In other words, the state army must not 
deliberately attempt to kill any of the rebels. By the same token, this means that rebel attacks 
must be directed at, and limited to, achieving the objectives of their rebellion.  
In addition to recognition of Prisoners of War (POWs) status and the prohibition of 
the use of indiscriminate use of force  among the other protections guaranteed in international 
armed conflicts, there are a number of rules of engagement which are particularly relevant  to 
fighting against rebels in Islamic law which include: (1) The rebels “could not be pursued if 
in rout”128 or when they are escaping from the battlefield.129 (2) The rebels’ property could 
not be taken as spoils of the war.130 (3) Their women and children cannot be enslaved.131( 4) 
Their wounded cannot be killed.132 The instruction of the fourth Caliph reads: 
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When you defeat them [rebels], do not kill their wounded, do not behead the 
prisoners, do not pursue those who return and retreat, do not enslave their women, do 
not mutilate their dead, do not uncover what is to remain covered, do not approach 
their property except what you find in their camp of weapons, beasts, male or female 
slaves: all the rest is to be inherited by their heirs according to the Writ of God.133 
Furthermore, weapons confiscated from the rebels in the battlefield cannot be used by the 
state army in the fighting against the rebels except in the case of military necessity134 and 
after the cessation of hostilities all confiscated weapons must be returned to the rebels.135 
More importantly, the vast majority of the Muslim jurists agree that captured rebels must be 
set free136, but they disagree on whether they are to be released during or after the cessation 
of hostilities, or after the rebels no longer constitute a danger to the state.137 In addition to 
that, both the rebels and the government soldiers are equally not liable for the destruction of 
life and property during the hostilities138 provided that, as referred to above, this was dictated 
by military necessity and was directed at, and limited to, achieving the objectives of using 
force in this category of internal conflict, as shown above.139 This proves without a doubt that 
rebels fighting for a just cause are not criminals and that there is no punishment for them 
under Islamic law.140 Moreover, the Islamic law of rebellion gives legal recognition to the 
rebels/secessionists for the sentences they pass and the executions they carry out during their 
control of a certain territory of the Islamic state provided that these sentences do not 
contradict Islamic law.141 
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VI.  The Potential of Islamic Law of Rebellion to Complement International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
The existing legal regime offered by International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is lacking in 
clarity and preciseness. This is evidenced, for example, by the uncertainty concerning the 
scope of Common Article 3, the threshold of Additional Protocol II and lack of opportunity 
for judicial creativity in applying rules relating to international armed conflicts to non-
international armed conflicts. For instance, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda found it very difficult to apply IHL to internal armed conflict as it 
concluded that doing so would hinder the underlying protective purpose of both the Genevan 
Conventions and its Additional Protocols.142 In addition, the practice of recognising situations 
of belligerency is almost obsolete, with parent states unwilling to confer legitimacy on rebels 
by recognising them, for fear that such legitimisation could endanger their state sovereignty. 
The same problem of state sovereignty persists in the realm of IHL.   
The paucity of provisions in the Geneva Conventions dealing with non-state actors is 
testimony to the primacy of state sovereignty over humanitarianism.143 The state sovereignty 
issue also impeded the extension of the IHL regime to non-state actors during the Diplomatic 
Conference 1974-1977.144 While some states may argue that granting rebel status would fuel 
and legitimise terrorism campaigns145 and others may point to the problems that non-state 
actors would face in trying to implement treaty burdens which were created for states,146 the 
main argument behind the extension of the IHL regime concerning combatant and prisoners 
of war status both during the conference and since is that of “state sovereignty”. However, an 
effective solution to this “state sovereignty” problem has been proffered by Islamic law 
which does not distinguish between international and non-international armed conflict, rather 
it makes universal application of the rights and status of rebels on equal footing with the 
rights and duties of the rulers.147 Furthermore, in practice a trend has emerged among both 
state actors and non-state actors of applying IHL provisions unofficially during a conflict, 
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thus avoiding armed conflict categorisation issues.148  This does not affect state sovereignty 
as non-state actors are not given official recognition and so is an acceptable compromise.  
While the question of the permissibility of rebellion under Islamic law seems to be 
unsettled, the issue of combatant and prisoner of war status under the Islamic system149 seems 
to be much more protective of captured rebels than international customary law and IHL and 
could inform judicial interpretations of the status of those captured in a rebellion situation. 
Furthermore, the Islamic law of rebellion guarantees the right of political opposition to 
tyranny or the violations of the rule of law by state regimes and provides a series of 
mechanisms to resolve the conflict peacefully through discussion, negotiation and arbitration. 
No less importantly, the strict rules on the use of force peculiar to armed rebellion are equally 
applicable to both the rebels and the armed forces of the state and so considerably humanise 
this kind of internal armed conflict.  
In fact, there is a lack of protection of peaceful opposition to the regimes in most of 
the Muslim countries let alone resort to armed rebellion. No Muslim country at present 
applies the Islamic law of rebellion no matter how much these regimes claim adherence to 
Islamic law.150 For example, both Saudi Arabia and Sudan, which claim to apply Islamic law 
as a whole, have adopted the laws of banditry and apostasy into their legal systems but 
omitted, without comment, the law of rebellion.151 Obviously for the regimes in the Muslim 
world the application of aḥkām al-bughāh would be impractical, excessively lenient and give 
the green light to every opposition group to take up arms against the state. But what is indeed 
regrettable here is that Muslim countries do not develop Islamic modalities of post-conflict 
justice;152 they do not even adopt Islamic conflict resolution mechanisms in the case of armed 
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rebellion as pointed out in the Qur’ānic text 49:9 and developed by the classical Muslim 
jurists over thirteen centuries ago.153    
To conclude, the recent waves of violence in the Arab world committed either by the 
state against innocent civilians during peaceful demonstrations, or by insurgents against both 
the state authorities and/or innocent civilians, is in stark contradiction to Islamic law. The 
incursions of politics into the development and implementation of the Islamic law of 
rebellion is well demonstrated by the current practice of governments which often accuse 
rebels of treason, terrorism and crimes which are opposed to Islamic law of rebellion.  
In its nature, rebellion is opposition to political abuse of power and this should have 
received more attention and treatment by international law but it has not been the case. The 
above examination of the legal framework of public international law suggests that it does not 
put the rebels and the governments on an equal footing but instead favours the already 
powerful governments against their opponents i.e., rebels. If the rights of rebels are not 
recognised and the powers of governments to use force against rebels are not effectively 
regulated then the latter is likely to resort to asymmetrical methods of warfare against their 
opponents, who are in a much stronger position in the current legal framework. Therefore, as 
long as the rebels and governments are not on an equal footing in terms of accountability and 
legal protection, the use of excessive and asymmetrical force is likely to be carried on by both 
parties to the conflict, with the rebels knowing that they will either be killed or prosecuted by 
their opponents who will not be held accountable in any way.  
In contrast, Islamic law has made a platform where rulers and rebels are on an equal 
footing. While the Islamic law of rebellion does not endorse or legitimate rebellion without 
limit, it does not give rulers unfettered discretion in dealing with rebels. In other words, 
Islamic law allows rebellion if it is legitimate to use force against an unjust ruler and it has 
provided the criteria when a ruler can be classified as unjust. It also imposes limitations on 
the use of force by rulers against rebels. Therefore, it can be concluded that the status and 
protection offered by Islamic international law to rebels is more organised and advanced than 
that offered by International Humanitarian Law. Hence, Islamic law may be regarded as a 
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positive contribution in the development of Public international law in providing an effective 
framework to deal with rebellion which is an oft-occurring situation in the modern world.  
VII. Conclusion 
The political unwillingness of state authorities to recognise the right of rebellion and use of 
force by rebels has resulted in the lack of an effective international legal framework to deal 
with rebellion. The UN Charter deals with internal armed conflict as an “international peace 
and security” issue but fails to deal with it by providing an effective legal framework.154 The 
existing legal framework of public international law, namely the Geneva Conventions and its 
Additional Protocols, does not effectively meet the challenge posed by the nature of the 
conflict between rebels and rulers.155 This framework provides illegitimate advantages to 
state authorities over rebels in the recognition of right to rebel  and in the treatment of rebels. 
This has resulted in an imbalanced platform of law and politics. This imbalanced platform 
has raised the question of legitimacy of public international law which has not only widened 
the gap between the legal protection of rulers and rebels but also failed to effectively regulate 
rebellion. In addition, this legitimacy question has also been raised in regard to the use of 
force by the authorities of Muslim states who constantly ignore the rights and the status of 
rebels as recognised in Islamic law. In these circumstances, it is necessary for public 
international law to fill this gap by adopting the juristic tradition of Islamic law of rebellion 
which is a distinct legal system that enjoys a long tradition of juristic engagement with use of 
force by and against rebels.  
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